Eighth Workshop on Principles and Methods of Statistical Inference with Interval Probability

August 4, 2015

Munich, September 1 – 6th, 2015


The Working Group Methodological Foundations of Statistics and their Applications at the Department of Statistics, and the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy at Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich (LMU), is proud to host a workshop on principles and methods of statistical inference with interval probability for the third time. This workshop is a follow-up to earlier WPMSIIPs held in Durham (2008, 2010), Ljubljana (2011), Lugano (2013), Ghent (2014) and Munich (2009,2012).

Confirmed Participants

Everyone, including PhD students, is welcome to participate and /or to present their views on one or more of the covered topics, on one or more days! We welcome any stimulating contribution, ranging from a presentation to a short informal statement. If you want to join the workshop, please contact Julia Plaß and the organizers of the specific day(s) that you would like to contribute to.


The Role of Explanatory Considerations in Updating

June 10, 2015

Heads up for any C&I readers interested in probabilistic models and how they relate to the psychology of updating, check out the following two articles coauthored with Igor Douven.  Both were published in the last month, and both are freely available at the moment.

I’m especially proud of this joint work, which defends explanationist (and probabilist) models of human learning over and above prevailing Bayesian models.  For more detail, abstracts are below the fold…

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Four Waves in the Philosophy of Statistics

January 25, 2014

Deborah Mayo is posting slides from here Philosophy of Statistics course here.

Mayo on Confirmation and the Tacking Problem

October 20, 2013

Deborah Mayo has an engaging post on Bayesian confirmation theory here.

Epistemic Utility Theory 2013

June 4, 2013

Summer School on Epistemic Utility Theory
EUT 2013, Bristol
August 17-18, 2013

EUT is organized by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bristol and coordinated by Richard Pettigrew, Jason Konek, and Ben Levinstein.


  • Jim Joyce
  • Katie Steele
  • Rachael Briggs
  • Branden Fitelson
  • Kenny Easwaran

Deadline for registration is July 15, 2013. Grad Student Paper CfP deadline: July 5, 2013.

For details, visit https://sites.google.com/site/bristolsummerschool.

[Cross posted at Certain Doubts]

PROGIC 2013 Program

May 6, 2013

Munich Center for Philosophy of Science

September 17-18

Invited talks

  • Igor Douven (Groningen) Conditionals and closure. Abstract.
  • Alan Hájek (Australia National University) Probabilities of counterfactuals and counterfactual probabilities. Abstract.
  • Kevin T. Kelly & Hanti Lin (Carnegie Mellon) Qualitative reasoning that tracks Jeffrey conditioning. Abstract.
  • Hannes Leitgeb (Munich) Belief and stable probability. Abstract.
  • Peter Milne (Stirling) Information, confirmation, and conditionals. Abstract.

Contributed talks

  • Glauber De Bona, Fabio G. Cozman & Marcelo Finger (São Paulo) Towards classifying propositional probabilistic logics.
  • Liam Bright (Carnegie Mellon) Measuring degrees of incoherence.
  • Teddy Groves (Kent) An application of Carnapian inductive logic to philosophy of statistics.
  • Hykel Hosni (LSE/Scuola Normale Superiore), Tommaso Flaminio (DiSTA) & Lluís Godo (IIIA) On the logical structure of de Finetti’s notion of event.
  • Arthur Paul Pedersen (Max Planck Institute) Prospects for a theory of non-Archimedean expected utility: Impossibilities and possibilities.
  • Dana Scott (Carnegie Mellon) A stochastic λ-calculus.
  • Stanislav O. Speranski (Novosibirsk State) Quantification over events in probability logic and its applications to elementary analysis.
  • Sean Walsh (Irvine) Empiricism, probability, and knowledge of arithmetic.
  • Jon Williamson (Kent) & Jürgen Landes (Munich) Objective Bayesian epistemology for inductive logic on predicate languages.

For more information: http://www.pfeifer-research.de/progic/

Rotten apples, Lockean belief, and Booleanosis

May 3, 2013

The Lockean thesis maintains that an individual fully believes a proposition p just when he has a high level of confidence in p.  The received view has it that the problem with Lockean accounts of qualitative belief  is summed up by Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox, which pits high-probability acceptance rules against the rule of adjunction. For Kyburg, there was no paradox, but instead a misplaced commitment to the rule of adjunction, a condition he famously described as “conjunctivitis”.  

Less observed is a problem for Lockean belief and disjunction (Kyburg, Teng, and Wheeler 2007). It turns out that Lockeans expose themselves to a pernicious form of amalgamation reversals (a.k.a., “Simpson’s paradox”) which cannot be handled by the known recipes for avoiding such reversals (Good and Mittal 1987).  Below the fold is an example and short discussion.

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