Common Belief, Revision, and Backward Induction

March 6, 2012

Patricia Rich of the Department of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon University will deliver a Games and Decisions lecture, “Common Belief, Revision, and Backward Induction,” on Wednesday, March 7, 2012, at Carnegie Mellon University. What follows is an abstract of her Games and Decisions lecture.

Whether rationality and common belief in rationality among the players of centipede games jointly entail the backward inductive outcome has long been argued without consensus. Arguments that these conditions are not sufficient often turn on the claim that there is no justification for supposing that players with initial common belief in rationality would retain such beliefs upon witnessing an unexpected move by an opponent. I will describe one of the more compelling such arguments, due to Stalnaker, who argues that we should use our best theory of belief revision, AGM, to determine which belief changes during a game are rational given the players’ prior beliefs. Stalnaker claims that the AGM axioms do not justify any special assumptions about how players revise from initial common belief in rationality, so that — critically — rational players may decide that their opponents are irrational if those players make non-backward inductive moves; departures from backward induction are therefore permissible. I disagree, arguing that while the content of the common belief (i.e. rationality) does not justify any additional assumptions about belief revision, the structure of common belief does, in accordance with the principles of AGM; I will employ Grove’s revealing sphere-based modelling of AGM to demonstrate this. I then prove a general theorem: Given my proposed constraint on rational belief revision, for all finite, n-player, extensive form, perfect information games with a unique backward induction solution, if there is initial common belief in rationality, then the backward inductive outcome is guaranteed. Further, if the longest branch of the game tree has n+1 decision nodes, initial n’th level mutual belief in rationality suffices for the result.


Games and Decisions Group
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University

Wednesday, March 7, 2012
12:30-1:30 pm   Baker Hall 135

As usual, all are invited to attend. To ensure that we can accommodate all lunchtime guests, please contact Teddy Seidenfeld or Kevin Zollman to signal your intention to attend.


Kelly and Lin at the ILLC

January 19, 2012

At the ILLC in Amsterdam, a new monthly LogiCIC seminar series has been organized within the ERC project on “The Logical Structure of Correlated Information Change”. The organizers of the first seminar, Sonja Smets and Nina Gierasimczuk, invite all to participate.

Every month, the seminar will host one or two invited speakers who present their latest research results on topics in Logic, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. For the opening of this seminar next Tuesday, two speakers will present: Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin from Carnegie Mellon University.

Time: Tuesday, January 24 2012, 16:00-18:00
Place: Amsterdam, Science Park 904, room A1.10

Programme:
16:00-16:50 Kevin T. Kelly (joint with Hanti Lin), “Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning”
16:50-17:10 Coffee Break
17:10-18:00 Hanti Lin (joint with Kevin T. Kelly), “Uncertain Acceptance and Contextual Dependence on Questions”

Abstracts:

Title: Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning
Abstract: This paper concerns the extent to which propositional reasoning can track probabilistic reasoning, which addresses kinematic problems that extend the familiar Lottery paradox. An acceptance rule (Leitgeb 2010) assigns to each Bayesian credal state p a propositional belief revision method B_p, which specifies an initial belief state B_p(\top), that is revised into the new propositional belief state B(E) upon receipt of information E. The acceptance rule *tracks* Bayesian conditioning when B_p(E) = B_p|_E(\top), for every E such that p(E) > 0; namely, when acceptance by propositional belief revision equals Bayesian conditioning followed by acceptance. Standard proposals for acceptance and belief revision do not track Bayesian conditioning. The “Lockean” rule that accepts propositions above a probability threshold is subject to the familiar lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961), and we show that it is also subject to new and more stubborn paradoxes when the tracking property is taken into account. Moreover, we show that the familiar AGM approach to belief revision (Harper 1975 and Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985) cannot be realized in a sensible way by an acceptance rule that tracks Bayesian conditioning. Finally, we present a plausible, alternative approach that tracks Bayesian conditioning and avoids all of the paradoxes. It combines an odds-based acceptance rule proposed originally by Levi (1996) with a non-AGM belief revision method proposed originally by Shoham (1987). As an application, the Lottery paradox turns out to receive a new solution motivated by dynamic concerns.

Title: Uncertain Acceptance and Contextual Dependence on Questions
Abstract: The preface paradox goes like this: an author may argue for a thesis in each chapter of her book, but in the preface she does not want to be committed to the conjunction of all theses, allowing for the possibility of error. The paradox illustrate a problem about acceptance of uncertain propositions across questions: for each chapter, there is the binary question whether its conclusion is correct; the preface asks a more complex question, namely, which theses are correct. The paradox is that asking for more can yield less. This paper addresses the extent to which acceptance of uncertain propositions depends on the question in context, by providing two impossibility results formulated in the following. Let uncertainty be modeled by subjective probability. Understand a *question* as having potential, complete answers that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive; understand *answers* as disjunctions of complete answers. Assume that accepted answers within each question are closed under entailment. Assume, further, that acceptance is *sensible* in the sense that contradiction is never accepted, that answers of certainty are always accepted, and that every answer can be accepted without certainty. Then, as our first result, it is impossible that acceptance is *independent of questions*, namely, that if a proposition is accepted as an answer to a question, then it is accepted in every question to which it is an answer.

In light of the preceding result, one might settle on a weaker sense of question-independence. Say that a question is *refined* by another question if and only if each answer to the former question continues to be an answer to the latter question. As a weakening of question-independence, *refinement-monotonicity* requires that when an answer is accepted in a question, that answer is also accepted in every refined question. But refinement-monotonicity is too strong to be plausible, because, due to our second result, it is inconsistent with two intuitive principles for reasoning within each individual question. These two principles are: *cautious monotonicity* (i.e., do not retract accepted propositions when you learn what you already accept), and *case reasoning* (i.e., accept a proposition if it would be accepted no matter whether information E or its negation is learned), where information learning is assumed to follow the Bayesian ideal of conditioning.


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 35 other followers