Choice & Inference

At the Northern Institute of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen we will  be having a one week school in formal epistemology, taking place on 14-18  June 2010.

The goal of our school is to bring people up to speed on certain areas of  formal epistemology (listed below). We hope to bring those attending up to  the point where they have a sense of the cutting edge of the subjects being  covered, and understand outstanding issues and problems that researchers   hope to address in the future. Our target audience will be philosophers who  have a background in logic, but not necessarily in formal epistemology. We  particularly welcome the attendance of graduate students.

Here are our speakers, and the subjects they will cover:

Alexandru Baltag (Oxford) and Sonja Smets (Groningen), Belief revision  theory and dynamic epistemic logic [4 lectures].

Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg), Bayesian networks in epistemology and the  philosophy of science [3 lectures].

Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew (Bristol), Non-pragmatic vindications  of probabilism and of diachronic norms [4 lectures].

Jonathan Weisberg (Toronto), Upper and lower probabilities, Dempster-
Shafer functions, John Pollock””s system for defeasible reasoning [3 lectures].

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On August 5-6, the Royal Academy of Sciences of the Netherlands hosts a
master class on the stochastic theory of causality. There are still a few
places for interested students and young researchers. Please visit:

http://www.waldorp.nl/lourens/wShopCausality.htm

The course is free of charge, and will include an introduction to
EffectLite, a free programme for the statistical analysis of causal
relations.

We are happy to announce that Phloxshop II: Modality is now open for registration.

The workshop will focus on counterfactual reasoning, modal knowledge, and modal idioms in natural language.

a. Date and Place

Phloxshop II will take place from the 9th to the 11th of September at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.

b. Keynote Speakers

• Dorothy Edgington (Birkbeck College London)

• Keith Hossack (Birkbeck College London)

c. Speakers and Commentators

• Thomas Kroedel (Konstanz) – Counterfactuals and Modal Knowledge

Commentator: David Etlin (Tufts)

• Murali Ramachandran (Sussex) – A Puzzle about Conditionals

Commentator: Christian Nimtz (Erlangen)

• Louis deRosset (Vermont) – Overcoming Inconstancy

Commentator: Sonia Roca Royes (Stirling)

• Jeff Russell (NYU) – Actuality for Counterpart Theorists

Commentator: Dylan Dodd (St. Andrews)

• Moritz Schulz (Phlox): Counterfactuals and Epistemic Modals

Commentator: Lee Walters (UCL)

• Barabara Vetter (Oxford) – Abilities and the Semantics of ‘Can’

Commentator: Jessica Leech (Geneva)

• Richard Woodward (Leeds) – Fictionalism and Conditionals

Commentator: Jonathan Ichikawa (St. Andrews)

d. Format

There are two to four 90 minute sessions per day (with a free afternoon on Wednesday). Each speaker will present a précis of her/his paper, followed by a reply by an invited commentator. There will be ample time for extended discussion.

e. Full papers

Full versions of the papers will be made available online by the 15th of August to registered participants only. Since speakers only present short introductions to their papers, participants are asked to read the full versions in advance.

f. Registration

Registration is free of charge. Nevertheless, we ask prospective participants to register for the conference by the 1st of September.

By registering you will gain access to the full versions of the papers that will be presented at the workshop. Just send an email to justbecause [at] gmx [dot] de with your name, affiliation and the subject line “Phloxshop II registration”.

If you have any further questions about the workshop, check the Phloxshop II conference website at http://phloxshop2.wordpress.com or email us at the above address.

Phloxshop II is organised by the members of the Phlox research group.

Modelling Preference Change

Preference change is a phenomenon that everyone experiences in himself or herself. Such change can be gradual or radical, expected or surprising, caused by external experiences (such as encountering another culture) or by internal influences (such as aging), and so on.

How should preference change be explained and modelled? This is a methodological question of tremendous importance, with repercussions in various areas such as dynamic decision theory, welfare economics, consumer theory, moral psychology, philosophy of mind, political science, and the study of deliberation.

Yet the question is far from settled, and a science of preference change, if it exists at all at this point, is certainly in its infancy. To mention only one point of disagreement, standard rational choice models explain every preference change by an underlying belief change, whereas critics reject this reduction.

The aim of this workshop is to bring together different researchers with interests in this area and to discuss fresh perspectives.

Draft Programme

Thursday, 28th May

13.30
Welcome and Introduction

13.40
Richard Bradley (LSE)
Revising Conditional Preferences

14.30
Coffee Break

15.00
Nick Baigent (Graz)
Consequentialism, Preference and Choice

15.50
Coffee Break

16.20
Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund)
Preference Utilitarianism by Way of Preference Change?

17.10
Short Break

17.20
Conrad Heilmann (LSE)
Preference Change in the Multiple-Self

18.10
Drinks at George IV

19.00
Workshop Dinner (details tba)

Friday, 29th May

09.30
Coffee, Tea and Snacks

10.00
Peter Hammond (Warwick/Stanford)
Aberrant Events and Enlivened Decision Trees

10.50
Coffee Break

11.20
Sven Ove Hansson (Stockholm)
Preference Change and Belief Change – What is the Difference?

12.10
Lunch

13.30
Christian List (LSE)
Non-Informational Preference Change, Part 1 (joint work with Franz Dietrich)

14.20
Coffee Break

14.50
Franz Dietrich (LSE and Maastricht)
Non-Informational Preference Change, Part 2 (joint work with Christian List)

15.40
Coffee Break

16.10
Brian Hill (HEC Paris)
Belief and Preference Change

17.00
Short Break

17.10
Krister Bykvist (Oxford)
Well-Being for Changing Selves

18.00
Drinks at George IV

Dinner (own arrangements)

Saturday, 30th May

09.30
Coffee, Tea and Snacks

10.00
Sébastien Konieczny (CRIL – CNRS Lens)
Iterated Belief Revision and Improvement Operators

10.50
Coffee Break

11.20
Katie Steele (LSE)
The Trouble with Modelling Higher-Order Preference

12.10
Short Break

12.20
Luc Bovens (LSE)
The Ethics of Nudge

13.10
ends

13.30
Lunch (own arrangements)

Directions

Venue: London School of Economics, Lakatos Building (building T on the LSE campus map)
All talks will be in T206 (second floor). All breaks will be in T114 (first floor).

Further Information

Participation is free of charge but registration is needed. Please email c.heilmann @ lse.ac.uk if you are interested in registering for this workshop or if you have any other questions.

The workshop is organized in collaboration with the LSE Choice Group. The LSE Choice Group is a group of people based for the most part at the LSE with a shared interest in the theory of rational decision making in individuals and groups and its application to economic, political and social questions. We hold regular seminars on Wednesday afternoons from 17-30 to 19-00 in T206 (2nd floor, Lakatos Building, Portugal Street. Please email c.heilmann @ lse.ac.uk if you are interested in regular updates on seminars and events.

Graduate Conference 2009
Philosophy of Probability II
8th – 9th June 2009
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
London School of Economics (LSE)

Organizers: Foad Dizadji-Bahmani and Conrad Heilmann

Supported by the British Society for the Philosophy of Science<http://www.thebsps.org/> and the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/philosophyLogicAndScientificMethod/> at the LSE

The Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science invites registration for its second graduate conference in Philosophy of Probability to be held at the London School of Economics.
Programme

Monday, 8th June

10.15

Welcome and Introduction

10.30

Keynote Speaker: Alan Hájek (ANU) All Values Great and Small

12.00

Lunch

13.30

Daniel Greco (MIT) Significance Testing in Theory and Practice

Comment: Brendan Clarke (UCL)

14.20

Tea/Coffee Break

14.40

Moritz Schulz (Humboldt Universität Berlin) What Should I Believe?

Comment: Ittay Nissan (LSE)

15.30

Tea/Coffee Break

15.50

Bengt Autzen (LSE) Bayesianism and the Principal Principle

Comment: Wolfgang Pietsch (Technische Universität München)

16.40

Tea/Coffee. We finish day one in time for the British Society for Philosophy of Science Presidential Address.

British Society for Philosophy of Science (BSPS) event<http://www.thebsps.org/society/bsps/events.html>

17.15

Harvey Brown (Oxford) BSPS Presidential Address

Tuesday, 9th June

10.30

Alastair Wilson (Oxford) Contextual Admissibility, Deterministic Chance, and Counterfactuals

Comment: Luke Glynn (Oxford)

11.20

Tea/Coffee Break

11.40

Owen Rees (Bristol) An Investigation into the Validity of the Dutch Book Argument

Comment: Jonny Blamey (KCL)

12.30

Lunch

14.00

Seamus Bradley (LSE) Against Probabilism

Comment: Iñaki San Pedro (Universidad Complutense Madrid)

14.50

Tea/Coffee Break

15.30

Panel: “Risk and Probability in Philosophy of Public Policy”, chaired by Luc Bovens (LSE).

Keynote speakers: Katie Steele (LSE), Jonathan Wolff (UCL)

17.00

Drinks at George IV–conference ends.

Registration
The conference is free but registration is required. Lunch and tea/coffee will be provided on both days.
To register please email f.dizadji-bahmani@lse.ac.uk<mailto:f.dizadji-bahmani@lse.ac.uk> with your name and affiliation.

Venue
New Academic Building, London School of Economics. All talks will be in the Wolfson Theatre, NABLG01. Directions to LSE can be found here<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/mapsAndDirections/Home.aspx>, the LSE Campus Map is here<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/mapsAndDirections/findingYourWayAroundLSE.aspx>.
Contact

For further information, do not hesitate to contact Foad: f.dizadji-bahmani@lse.ac.uk<mailto:f.dizadji-bahmani@lse.ac.uk>

Please access the attached hyperlink for an important electronic communications disclaimer: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/secretariat/legal/disclaimer.htm

Please access the attached hyperlink for an important electronic communications disclaimer: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/secretariat/legal/disclaimer.htm
Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html. Prolonged discussions should be moved to chora: enrol via http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/chora.html.
Other philosophical resources on the Web can be found at http://www.liv.ac.uk/pal.

Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html. Prolonged discussions should be moved to chora: enrol via http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/chora.html. Other philosophical resources on the Web can be found at http://www.liv.ac.uk/pal.

Workshop on Metacognition, Belief Change and Conditionals
11-12 September 2009
Department of Philosophy
Institute for Advanced Studies
University of Bristol, UK

Metacognition, i.e. “thinking about thinking” or introspection, is a
crucial topic in various areas of philosophy. Metacognitive processes
involving conditionals are of particular interest: e.g., if an indicative
conditional is accepted by a rational agent, this seems to express
something about the agent’s state of mind. Is accepting a conditional
therefore always metacognitive? What are the rational acceptance
conditions of conditionals that describe an agent’s state of mind
explicitly? How should one update one’s beliefs in the light of
introspective information?
The main goal of this workshop is to explore the logical and epistemic
relationships between metacognition, belief change, and conditionals.
Formal Epistemology, with its qualitative (epistemic logic, belief
revision, ranking functions) and quantitative (probability theory)
accounts of belief states and belief change offers a good framework for
gaining a better understanding of all normative aspects of metacognition.
At the same time, new empirical findings on metacognition might call our
established philosophical theories into question.

The following is a list of the speakers:
Richard Bradley (London School of Economics, UK)
Igor Douven (University of Leuven, Belgium)
Simone Duca (University of Bristol, UK)
Paul Egre’ (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris)
Andre’ Fuhrmann (Goethe Universitaet, Frankfurt, Germany)
Sten Lindstrom (University of Umea, Sweden)
Hans Rott (University of Regensburg, Germany)

A collection of invited papers on the topic of the workshop will be
published as a special issue of the journal “Topoi” in early 2011.
So far, contributors to the issue include Richard Bradley, Igor Douven,
Simone Duca, Paul Egre’, Alan Hajek and Sten Lindstrom.

Attendance is free, but please e-mail the address below to reserve a place.
For any enquiries please contact:

Simone Duca
Department of Philosophy
University of Bristol
plxsd@bristol.ac.uk

Progic 2009 – 4th Workshop on Combining Probability and Logic, to be held in Groningen, The Netherlands, 17-19 September 2009

http://www.philos.rug.nl/progic2009/

We welcome submissions of papers on the special focus of the workshop, or indeed on any aspect of combining probability and logic. The deadline for submitting abstracts is June 1st.

The special focus is “New approaches to rationality in decision making”. The Progic workshop is organised in conjunction with the first meeting of a European research network on rationality and decision, pending a final funding decision.

Confirmed speakers for the joint event include: Johan van Benthem, Luc Bovens, Richard Bradley, Igor Douven, Stephan Hartmann, Jim Joyce, Christian List, Clemens Puppe, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Teddy Seidenfeld, and Jon Williamson.

We are pleased to announce that the Special Issue III of ABSTRACTA is now available at http://www.abstracta.pro.br/english/Default.asp. Our third Special Issue is dedicated to a symposium on Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory (MIT Press, 2007) by Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, both from Princeton University. We are proud to publish this critical discussion of such an important topic for philosophy of science in general (and of psychology, in particular) as well as contemporary epistemology.

In Reliable Reasoning Harman and Kulkarni take seriously the vexed philosophical problem of induction. They shed new light on it by proposing that philosophers can benefit from the application of statistical learning theory (and its mathematical framework) to approach that problem. As Harman and Kulkarni tell us in this symposium, their “intention in writing Reliable Reasoning was to suggest that basic statistical learning theory provides one sort of response to the traditional philosophical problem of induction, which asks what can be shown a priori about induction.”

Special Issue III – Table of Contents

• Editorial
• Gilbert Harman & Sanjeev Kulkarni: Precis of Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory
• Glenn Shafer: Comments on Harman and Kulkarni’s Reliable Reasoning
• Paul Thagard: Inference to the Best Inductive Practices
• Michael Strevens: Remarks on Harman and Kulkarni’s Reliable Reasoning
• Stephen José Hanson: Commentary on Reliable Reasoning
• Gilbert Harman & Sanjeev Kulkarni: Response to Shafer, Thagard, Strevens and Hanson