CMU Workshop on Foundations for Ockham’s Razor

June 1, 2012

Carnegie Mellon University, Center for Formal Epistemology presents:

Workshop on Foundations for Ockham’s Razor

All are welcome to attend.

June 22-24, 2012

Adamson WingBaker Hall 136A, Carnegie Mellon University

Workshop web page and schedule

Contact:  Kevin T. Kelly (kk3n@andrew.cmu.edu)

Rationale:  Scientific theory choice is guided by judgments of simplicity, a bias frequently referred to as “Ockham’s Razor”. But what is simplicity and how, if at all, does it help science find the truth? Should we view simple theories as means for obtaining accurate predictions, as classical statisticians recommend? Or should we believe the theories themselves, as Bayesian methods seem to justify? The aim of this workshop is to re-examine the foundations of Ockham’s razor, with a firm focus on the connections, if any, between simplicity and truth.

Speakers:


Daniel Kahneman: interview in Der Spiegel & 2012 Sackler Lecture

May 31, 2012

Spiegel Online interview in four parts, here.

Also, a video of Kahneman’s recent 2012 Sackler lecture, “The science of communication,” is here.


Stephan Hartmann receives an Alexander-von-Humboldt Professorship

April 30, 2012

Announcement here. Congratulations, Stephan!


Modality and Modalities / Copenhagen, May 29-30 / 2012

April 30, 2012

Modality and Modalities  is a two day CADILLAC event on all things Modal Logical. It will be held on Tuesday, 29th May and Wednesday, 30th May at the University of Copenhagen. The keynote speakers are Max Cresswell, Adriane Rini, and Krister Segerberg, and there will be a special tutorial presentation by Valentin Goranko.

All are welcome to attend, and attendance is free. But please: email CADILLAC if you plan on coming, so that they have some idea of how many to expect.


Two Reasons for Abolishing the PGR

April 24, 2012

The previous two posts on the PGR sampling problem (here and here) describe flaws in the PGR which render it unsound.  While the results of the survey might be accidentally true, in a Gettier sort of way, there is no reason to believe they are true.

Those flaws and others like them can be fixed, however, which is a starting point for reforming the PGR. But the PGR itself can be repaired only if there is a will to make the PGR work they way it is advertised to work.  Further, even if one were to start fresh with an alternative ranking system that ran on the level, one might still find that it leads to more harm than good. Each of these points offer grounds for abolishing the PGR.

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More on the Educational Imbalance within the PGR Evaluator Pool

April 19, 2012

We observed before that the 2011 PGR is unbalanced with respect to educational background.  That point can be captured graphically by merging the two earlier bubble plots—one representing the distribution of Home institutions (blue) and another for the distribution of PhD institutions (green)—into one.

(Click image to enlarge, or download the full-sized image in pdf or png format.  Also, the 2011 PGR data set is available as an excel file. If you cannot open .xlsx files and need .xls instead, please email me.)

The structure of the bias in educational background is robust. The median years of seniority for PGR raters, determined by the year the most advanced degree was awarded to each evaluator, is 22 years. Examining the younger segment of the rater pool (0 – 21 years of seniority) also finds half (47.3%) of the rankings submitted by alumni from just 8 universities.  And that pattern repeats, though with less dramatic effects as the pool gets sliced into smaller and smaller segments.  The composition of this top group is relatively stable through time as well, with some minor shuffling to make way for the rise of Rutgers. So, educational bias is a curiously durable feature of the PGR evaluator pool.

To this one might counter that the rater pool is, despite appearances, an accurate representation of the larger community of research active philosophers.  As I mentioned in my previous post, this position is hard to reconcile with objective measures of research activity, like the one that Jon Kvanvig put together at Certain Doubts.   But we don’t even need to bother wading into the controversies surrounding bibliometrics to clear this objection. Instead, simply look at the PGR itself and consider whether its own judgment of research excellence across its own 33 areas of specialization is reflected in the composition of the PGR evaluator pool.  Put simply, does the PGR walk the PGR talk?

The answer is, No, not really.

Read the rest of this entry »


Manufactured Assent: The Philosophical Gourmet Report’s Sampling Problem

April 17, 2012

The Philosophical Gourmet Report (PGR) purports to be a ranking of faculty reputation based on the opinions of “research-active” faculty, which it surely is. But the legitimacy of the PGR as an accurate measure of opinion relies in part on how well the PGR pool of evaluators reflects the population of research-active faculty.   Addressing this point, Brian Leiter remarks (here) on the selection procedure for the PGR evaluator pool:

Evaluators were selected with an eye to balance, in terms of area, age and educational background—though since, in all cases, the opinions of research-active faculty were sought, there was, necessarily, a large number of alumni of the top programs represented. Approximately half those surveyed were philosophers who had filled out the surveys in previous years; the other half were nominated by members of the Advisory Board, who picked research-active faculty in their fields.

However, the PGR evaluator pool is not balanced with respect to educational background, and the claim that the educational imbalance observed in the 2011 PGR is a necessary consequence of soliciting the opinion of research-active faculty is false.

Now, to criticize the composition of the PGR evaluator pool is not to criticize the individual members making up the pool. The focus of the discussion at C&I (here, here, here, here, and even here; see also Andrew Gelman’s post here) has been on methodology.  The point instead is this: if you are interested in an accurate picture of professional opinion but oversubscribe from some parts of the profession and systematically omit other parts altogether, you might end up with an accurate assessment. But knowing this much about your methods, there is no reason to believe that you will. That, in a nutshell, is the nature of the PGR sampling problem.
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Gabriella Pigozzi joins Choice and Inference

April 14, 2012

Gabriella Pigozzi has joined C&I as a new contributor. Welcome, Gabriella!


Everything you wanted to know about data mining but were afraid to ask

April 4, 2012

The Atlantic has published a guide to what data mining is, how it works, and why it’s important.

This article is an attempt to explain how data mining works and why you should care about it. Because when we think about how our data is being used, it is crucial to understand the power of this practice. Without data mining, when you give someone access to information about you, all they know is what you have told them. With data mining, they know what you have told them and can guess a great deal more. Put another way, data mining allows companies and governments to use the information you provide to reveal more than you think.

[HT Moshe Vardi].


From M-Phi: Pullum S(e)usses Out the Halting Problem

March 21, 2012

Delightful!


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