Here’s a plug for my new book! In defence of objective Bayesianism How strongly should you believe the various propositions that you can express? That is the key question facing Bayesian epistemology. Subjective Bayesians hold that it is largely (though not entirely) up to the agent as to which degrees of belief to adopt. Objective [...]

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Certain Doubts and Leiter have announced that John Pollock has died.  We had the fortune of having him as a speaker at CMU during the last FEW. He presented then a controversial paper on probable probabilities and Jay Kadane commented.  The discussion was quite interesting.  Echoes of Henry Kyburg’s philosophy of probability were clear in [...]

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A quick heads up: there is an interesting discussion going on at It’s Only a Theory pertaining to the question of whether Bayes’s Theorem has any “special epistemological significance.”

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I have been thinking a bit more about my last post in which I presented a short version of an argument that recurs throughout this book. Quoting myself, [This argument] goes something like this: formal philosophers, by and large, have become much too comfortable with a limited set of formal tools. Such formal tools have proven too [...]

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This morning, I read through (and very much enjoyed) Greg’s quick book review of Hendricks and Symon’s collection, Formal Philosophy: Aim, Scope, Direction - the review is hot off the presses in the new issue of Philosophy of science. Greg does a marvelous job of highlighting some of the most interesting ideas developed by the book’s contributors in a [...]

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