Structured Contents and Local Pragmatics

February 29, 2012

Mandy Simons, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon University, will deliver a faculty colloquium lecture, “Structured Contents and Local Pragmatics.” Simons current research addresses issues concerning the interpretation of natural language in formal semantics, pragmatics, and the philosophy of language. What follows is an abstract of her lecture to be delivered Thursday, March 1, 2012, at Carnegie Mellon University.

It is by now a truism that speakers can communicate by their linguistic utterances more than is conventionally encoded in the expressions used. In the Gricean paradigm, a broad range of cases of this sort is given an explanation along the following lines: the hearer expects the speaker to make a reasonable conversational contribution (where what counts as reasonable is articulated in various “conversational maxims”); the conventional content of the utterance does not satisfy this expectation; therefore the speaker must intend to communicate something more, or different. The additional material conveyed is called a conversational implicature.

One challenge that has been raised for the Gricean approach is the phenomenon of embedded pragmatic effects: cases where an apparent conversational implicature has its effect under the scope of some linguistic operator, such as disjunction or the conditional. It has been argued that Gricean reasoning cannot be applied to explain such embedded effects; and some have taken this to undermine the Gricean program overall.

The goal of this talk is to provide an approach to embedded pragmatic effects which is consistent with a generally Gricean understanding of implicature. In the first place, I’ll point out that the standard argument against a Gricean account of embedded pragmatic effects conflates two distinct notions. I’ll provide an account of a set of cases involving pragmatic enrichment of disjuncts, which entirely evades the issue targeted by the standard argument. In developing this account, I will also make a substantive claim about the type of semantic theory which must be assumed in order to properly account for the semantics/pragmatics interface: I’ll argue that we need to assume a theory on which semantic contents reflect the structure of the linguistic expressions which give rise to them.

Finally, (time permitting), I’ll sketch a natural extension of the standard Gricean picture which would dissolve the standard argument, paving the way for a Gricean treatment of additional cases of embedded pragmatic effects.


Philosophy Colloquium
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University

Thursday, March 1, 2012

Reception.
4:00-4:35 pm   Doherty Hall 4301

Lecture.
4:45-6:00 pm   Baker Hall A53

As usual, all are invited to attend.


Restall on Assertion, Denial and Paraconsistent Theories

February 24, 2012

Greg Restall of the School of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry at the University of Melbourne will deliver a lunchtime lecture, “Assertion, Denial and Paraconsistent Theories,” today, Friday, February 24, 2012, at Carnegie Mellon University.  What follows is a very brief abstract of his lecture.

 

I will consider developing distinctively paraconsistent mathematical theories, including a kind-of-fun variant of Russell’s and Curry’s paradoxes which does without negation or a conditional.


Lunchtime Talk
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University

Friday, February 24, 2012
12:00-1:00 pm   Doherty Hall 4303

As usual, all are invited to attend.  Bring a lunch.


Decisions without Sharp Probabilities, or Unsharp Probabilities without Decisions?

February 21, 2012

We are pleased to announce that Paul Weirich, Curators’ Professor of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Missouri-Columbia, will deliver a Games and Decisions lecture, “Decisions without Sharp Probabilities,” on Wednesday, February 22, 2012, at Carnegie Mellon University. Weirich, having earned a B.A. in philosophy from Saint Louis University, pursed a doctorate in philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles, earning a Ph.D. in 1977 for his thesis, Probability and Utility for Decision Theory, written under the supervision of Tyler Burge. In addition to numerous articles, Weirich is author of Collective Rationality: Equilibrium in Cooperative Games (OUP: 2010), Realistic Decision Theory: Rules for Nonideal Agents in Nonideal Circumstances (OUP: 2004), Decision Space: Multidimensional Utility Analysis (CUP: 2001), and Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules (CUP: 1998).  What follows is an abstract of his Games and Decisions lecture.

Adam Elga (2010) argues that no principle of rationality leads from unsharp probabilities to decisions. He concludes that a perfectly rational agent does not have unsharp probabilities. This paper defends unsharp probabilities. It shows how unsharp probabilities may ground rational decisions.

Unsharp probabilities arise from sparse or unspecific evidence. For example, meteorological evidence, because unspecific, often does not suggest a sharp probability that tomorrow will bring rain. An agent may assign to rain a range of probabilities going from, say, 0.4 to 0.6. Elga argues that unsharp probability assignments may lead an agent to a sure loss. In this event, a dilemma arises: the agent may have either unsharp probability assignments that accurately represent evidence, or sharp probabilities that prevent sure losses. Should an agent’s probability assignments be faithful to the evidence, or should they promote practical success? This paper maintains that an agent’s probability assignments can attain both goals.


Games and Decisions Group
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University

Wednesday, February 22, 2012
12:30-1:30 pm   Baker Hall 135

As usual, all are invited to attend. To ensure that we can accommodate all lunchtime guests, please contact Teddy Seidenfeld or Kevin Zollman to signal your intention to attend.


Philosophy Security Advisory System

February 20, 2012


2012 Consciousness Online Conference

February 18, 2012

…is online now.


Awodey on Foundations

February 15, 2012

Invigorated by recent exciting developments concerning the relationships between constructive logic and algebraic topology, Steve Awodey, Professor of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon University, will deliver a faculty Pure and Applied Logic colloquium lecture, “Homotopy Type Theory and Univalent Foundations of Mathematics.” Awodey, having studied mathematics and philosophy at the University of Marburg, pursued his Ph.D. in mathematics at the University of Chicago under the supervision of Saunders Mac Lane and William W. Tait, earning his doctorate in 1997 for his thesis, Logic in Topoi: Functorial Semantics for Higher-Order Logic.  What follows is an abstract of his lecture to be delivered Thursday, February 16, 2012, at Carnegie Mellon University.

It has recently been discovered that there is a close connection between constructive logic and algebraic topology. Martin-Löf’s system of constructive type theory provides a comprehensive foundation for mathematics as an alternative to set theory and supporting a somewhat different view of the mathematical universe. Its constructive character permits implementations in computer-aided proof systems, such as Coq, but its treatment of equality, in particular, has in the past seemed difficult to reconcile with classical mathematics. The new idea behind Homotopy Type Theory is the interpretation of constructive equality as homotopy, or continuous deformation, as a fundamental logical concept. The entire system of type theory then has a natural interpretation, not just as sets and functions as in conventional foundations, but as spaces and continuous mappings regarded as fundamental mathematical objects, the basic properties and constructions of which then have a direct, logical formalization. Logical constructions in type theory then correspond to invariant constructions on spaces, while theorems and even proofs in the logical system inherit a new geometric meaning. Geometrical intuition also suggests novel extensions of the logical system, leading to a fruitful interplay between geometry and logic. For example, one can use formal methods and even the Coq proof system to give computer-verified, formal proofs in classical homotopy theory.

The resulting possibility of a new computational foundation, not only for homotopy theory, but for large parts of constructive and classical mathematics, has recently led Fields medalist Vladimir Voevodsky (IAS) to propose a new system of foundations for mathematics. The Univalent Foundations Program is based on this homotopical interpretation of type theory and implemented in the proof system Coq. It is now being pursued by a rapidly-growing team of logicians, computer scientists, and homotopy theorists, and in 2012-13 it will be the focus of a special year at the Institute for Advanced Study.

This talk will survey some of these recent developments.


Pure and Applied Logic Colloquium
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University

Thursday, February 16, 2012

Reception.
4:00-4:35 pm   Doherty Hall 4301

Lecture.
4:45-6:00 pm   Baker Hall A53

As usual, all are invited to attend.


Frontiers of Rationality and Decision

February 14, 2012

Final workshop of a European research network Frontiers of Rationality and Decision

29-31 August 2012
University of Groningen, The Netherlands

Guest speakers: Branden FitelsonJeff HelznerSimon HuteggerKatya Tentori, and Kevin Zollman.

There is also a Groningen/Munich Summer School on Formal Methods in Philosophy (23-28 August),  organized by Catarina Dutilh-Novaes.


Choosing amongst Multiattributed Objects

February 7, 2012

Alec Morton of the London School of Economics will deliver a Games and Decisions lecture, “A Multicriteria Approach for Concavifiable Preferences.” The lecture is based on joint work with Nikos Argyris and José Rui Figueira. What follows is an abstract of his lecture to be delivered Wednesday, February 8, 2012, at Carnegie Mellon University.

A central problem in Multicriteria Decision Making is how to help a decision maker (DM) choose from a set of multiattributed objects when she does not know what she wants. We discuss in this talk the conditions under which preferences or preference intensities are “concavifiable,” that is to say, representable by a concave function. We show that, given information from a decision maker about her (concavifiable) preferences or preference intensities, it is possible to characterise the set of all possible value assignments to a given finite set of points in the multiattribute space in an appealing and intuitive way. We discuss how this idea could be used in two of the main MCDM paradigms, Multicriteria Decision Analysis and Interactive Multiobjective Programming to help the above mentioned DM come to a decision.


Games and Decisions Group
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University

Wednesday, February 8, 2012
12:30-1:30 pm BH 150

As usual, all are invited to attend. To ensure that we can accommodate all lunchtime guests, please contact Teddy Seidenfeld or Kevin Zollman to signal your intention to attend.


Support for graduate students interested in attending the New Science – New Risks conference …

February 1, 2012
The Center for Philosophy of Science will hold a conference on New Science – New Risks, March 30-31, 2012.  For details, visit the Center Website at www.pitt.edu/~pittcntr. We have limited support for a small number of qualified graduate students in a philosophy or philosophy of science program who are interested in attending. Qualified graduate students must be advanced in their graduate programs and working on a dissertation directly related to the topic of the conference. We are able to offer lodging for two nights at a nearby hotel or reimbursement of up to $300 against receipts for travel-related expenses.
Interested graduate students should contact Nils-Eric Sahlin, Chair of the Organizing Committee, at:  Nils-Eric.Sahlin@med.lu.se

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