Call for Papers: Logic Workshop at Buenos Aires

January 31, 2012

Call for Papers

Logic Workshop at Buenos Aires
A Tribute to Horacio Arló-Costa

SADAF, the Argentine Society for Philosophical Analysis, is organizing a Tribute to Horacio Arló-Costa, to take place in Buenos Aires, August 2nd to 4th, 2012.

Invited speakers:

Verónica Becher (Universidad de Buenos Aires)

John Collins (Columbia University)

Paul Egré (Jean Nicod Institute)

Jeff Helzner (Columbia University)

Rohit Parikh (City University of New York)

Fernando Tohmé (Universidad Nacional del Sur)

To be confirmed:

Cristina Bicchieri (University of Pensylvannia)

Alberto Moretti (SADAF-Universidad de Buenos Aires-CONICET)

Gladys Palau (Universidad de Buenos Aires)

Paul Pedersen (Carnegie Mellon University)

We call for contributions in any area of philosophical logic, including (but not limited to) epistemic and modal logic, ampliative reasoning, belief revision, conditional logic, game theory and decision theory, among other topics.

We invite submissions for 40-minute presentations. Submissions should take the form of a 1000/1500-word abstract. They should be sent by e-mail in an attached file in pdf format to info@sadaf.org.ar. Authors’ names and affiliation should be given only in the text of the e-mail message. The abstracts will be blind reviewed by an international scientific committee. English and Spanish will be the official languages of the conference. However, we encourage contributors to provide to the audience an extended abstract, ppt presentation, handout or full paper in English during the Conference.

Deadline for reception of submissionsMarch 30th, 2012

Communication of acceptance/rejection: May 30th, 2012

For further particulars, please check the SADAF website at www.sadaf.org.ar or contact us by sending an e-mail to info@sadaf.org.ar.

Organizing Committee: Eduardo Barrio, Eleonora Cresto, Sandra Lazzer, Diana Pérez.

Scientific Committee: Verónica Becher, John Collins, Paul Egré, Jeff Helzner, Alberto Moretti, Gladys Palau, Rohit Parikh, Fernando Tohmé.


About SADAF

SADAF, the Argentine Society for Philosophical Analysis, is a non-profit organization devoted to research in philosophy. It was founded in 1972, and at present it counts with more than two hundred members, many of which are either faculty members or advanced students at various universities in Argentina and abroad. SADAF offers seminars and colloquium series, and hosts different kinds of academic meetings all year round. Since 1981 it is also home of Análisis Filosófico, a biannual, peer-reviewed journal of philosophy. Horacio Arló-Costa was an active member of SADAF while he lived in Argentina, and kept close ties with our institution after leaving the country. More information in Spanish in www.sadaf.org.ar

Submitted by Eleonora Cresto


CFP Extended Deadline: Games, Interactive Rationality and Learning (G.I.R.L.`12@Lund)

January 30, 2012

1st Conference on
Games, Interactive Rationality and Learning

G.I.R.L.`12@Lund
Lund, Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science
April 19-21, 2012

Call for Papers
Deadline Extended: February 15, 2012

Calendar/Important dates.

February 15: Abstract submission deadline

March 1: Author notification

April 19-20: Conference

April 21 or April 28: Undergraduate/Graduate Session

Aims of the conference.

Formal philosophy relies increasingly on simulations, and sometimes on empirical test, coming closer to both computer-, cognitive- and social sciences. Some examples are learning-theoretic models of inquiry, network theory-based approaches in social epistemology, and game-theoretic evolutionary approaches of communication. The aim of the G.I.R.L.’12 Conference is to bring together researchers in philosophy, cognitive science and artificial intelligence, to investigate new areas where the game- and learning-theoretic simulation approaches can lead to fruitful results.

A central topic is interactive rationality, or rational behavior that emerges from interaction. Unlike “rational interaction”—its much better known sister—it does not presuppose agents to be rational to begin with. Examples are given by evolutionary game-theory, which studies rational (equilibrium-reaching) behavior emerging from interaction of non-reflective agents; or learning-theoretic models of inquiry showing how inquiry can solve inductive problems, while substituting truth-tracking efficiency to reflexive justification.

Subject.

We welcome submissions of either already published research, or original material, primarily on the following topics:

  • Relations between “ecological rationality” of choice and inference heuristics, and choice-, decision- and game-theoretic axiomatic approaches to rationality;
  • Models of signaling games, evolutionary games, or games with bounded agents;
  • Learning-theoretic approaches of inquiry, knowledge acquisition and reasoning;
  • Simulation-based approaches of group learning and decision-making in networks.

Submissions on related subjects not listed above are welcome. If the number of original contributions is sufficient, we will consider the
publication of a proceedings volume.

Submissions – Abstracts.

Original submission: abstracts of 200-500 words, plus bibliography

Published research: abstract of the published version, plus bibliography.

Submissions should be sent electronically in word or pdf format to justine[dot]jacot[at]fil[dot]lu[dot]se, with ”G.I.R.L.’12@Lund_Submission” in the subject line of the mail, and whether your submission is intended for the graduate session.

Deadline for submissions: February 15, 2012.

Invited Speakers (pending confirmation).

Alexandru Baltag (ILLC, Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Nina Gierasimczuk (University of Groningen, Netherlands)

Vincent F. Hendricks (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)

Kevin Kelly (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA, US)

Paul Pedersen (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA, US)

Ruth Poproski (Carnegie Mellon University , Pittsburgh PA, US)

Patricia Rich (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA, US)

Sonja Smets (University of Groningen, Netherlands and ILLC, Amsterdam)

Local organizing Committee.

Emmanuel Genot (Lund, Theoretical Philosophy)

Justine Jacot (Lund, Theoretical Philosophy)

Philip Pärnamets (Lund, Cognitive Science)

Webpage of the conference:

http://www.fil.lu.se/conferences/conference.asp?id=49&lang=se

Submitted by Justine Jacot


A Formal Epistemology Reader

January 30, 2012

A Formal Epistemology Reader

Edited by
Horacio Arló-Costa, Johan van Benthem, Vincent F. Hendricks
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012
ISBN 9781107608726 (paperback)
ISBN 9781107001794 (hardback)
Assistant Editors: Henrik Boensvang & Rasmus K. Rendsvig

Release date / Fall 2012

‘Formal epistemology’ is a term coined in the late 1990s for a new constellation of interests in philosophy,the roots of which are found in earlier works of epistemologists, philosophers of science, and logicians. It addresses a growing agenda of problems concerning knowledge, belief, certainty, rationality, deliberation, decision, strategy, action and agent interaction – and it does so using methods from logic, probability, computability, decision, and game theory. This volume presents 42 classic texts in formal epistemology, and strengthens the ties between research into this area of philosophy and its neighbouring intellectual disciplines. The editors provide introductions to five basic subsections: Bayesian Epistemology, Belief Change, Decision Theory, Interactive Epistemology and Logics of Knowledge and Belief. The volume also includes a thorough index and suggestions for further reading, and thus offers a complete teaching and research package for students as well as research scholars of formal epistemology, philosophy, logic,computer science, theoretical economics and cognitive psychology.

Read more about the collection, and view table of contents here: http://www.vince-inc.com/vincent/?p=1030.

[Cross posted at Certain Doubts]


Jeremy Avigad: Computability, Constructivity, and Convergence in Measure Theory

January 30, 2012

Jeremy Avigad, Professor of the Department of Philosophy and the Department of Mathematical Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University, will deliver a faculty colloquium lecture, “Computability, Constructivity, and Convergence in Measure Theory.” After earning a degree in mathematics from Harvard University, Avigad pursued a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of California, Berkeley, under the supervision of Jack Silver, earning his doctorate in 1995 for his thesis, Proof-Theoretic Investigations of Subsystems of Second-Order Arithmetic. With ongoing research interests in mathematical logic, proof theory, the philosophy of mathematics, formal verification, automated reasoning, and the history of mathematics, Avigad joined the Department of Philosophy in 1996 and the Department of Mathematical Sciences in 2007.  What follows is an abstract of his lecture to be delivered Thursday, February 2, 2012, at Carnegie Mellon University.

When confronted with a nonconstructive theorem, those interested in computational and constructive aspects of mathematics have various options: they can seek constructive and computational versions of the theorem in question; they can calibrate the extent to which the given theorem it nonconstructive; and they can look for computational or other explicit information hidden in the proof. I will discuss measure-theoretic convergence theorems that come up in the study of dynamical systems and stochastic processes, and give examples of all three approaches to understanding their constructive content.I will try to make the talk accessible to a broad audience.

Philosophy Colloquium
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University

Thursday, February 2, 2012

Reception.
4:00-4:35 pm DH 4301

Lecture.
4:45-6:00 pm BH A53

As usual, all are invited to attend.


With Permission, a Disjunction entails its Disjuncts

January 24, 2012

In addition to the Games and Decisions talk by Nils-Eric Sahlin on Wednesday, January 25,
Martin Aher of the Cognitive Science Institute of the University of Osnabrück will deliver a colloquium lecture, “Free Choice in Deontic Radical Inquisitive Semantics,” on Thursday, January 26. A Visiting Scholar of the Department of Philosophy, Aher is a Ph.D. student studying computational linguistics under the supervision of Carla Umbach and Jeroen Groenendijk. What follows is an abstract of his lecture to be delivered at Carnegie Mellon University.

We will propose a novel solution to the puzzle that the word “or” under permission, for example under “may,” loses standard entailment relations. While a disjunction is generally entailed by its disjuncts, under permission it receives a “free choice” reading where the disjunction entails its disjuncts. Our solution is driven by empirical data from legal discourse and does not suffer from the same problems as implicature-based accounts. We will argue against implicature-based accounts and provide an entailment-based solution. The framework for the proposal is inquisitive semantics, which will be introduced in its radical form. Following Anderson’s violation-based deontic logic, we will demonstrate that a support-based radical inquisitive semantics will correctly model both the free choice effect and the boolean standard entailment relations in downward entailing contexts. An inquisitive semantics is especially suited to model cases where the continuation “but I do not know which” coerces an ignorance reading. It also demonstrates that the counterarguments to deontic reduction failed to take into account the effects of different utterances in conversation, such that a refined definition of radical inquisitive entailment renders such inferences invalid. Furthermore, we will argue that the problem of strengthening the antecedent that is used as a counterargument against entailment-based accounts also fails under a refined notion of entailment.


Philosophy Colloquium
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University

Thursday, January 26, 2012

Reception.
4:00-4:35 pm DH 4301

Lecture.
4:45-6:00 pm BH A53

As usual, all are invited to attend.


Call for Papers: Games, Interactive Rationality and Learning (G.I.R.L.`12@Lund)

January 23, 2012

1st Conference on
Games, Interactive Rationality and Learning

G.I.R.L.`12@Lund
Lund, Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science
April 19-21, 2012

Call for Papers
Deadline January 31, 2012

Aims of the conference.

Formal philosophy relies increasingly on simulations, and sometimes on empirical test, coming closer to both computer-, cognitive- and social sciences. Some examples are learning-theoretic models of inquiry, network theory-based approaches in social epistemology, and game-theoretic evolutionary approaches of communication. The aim of the G.I.R.L.’12 Conference is to bring together researchers in philosophy, cognitive science and artificial intelligence, to investigate new areas where the game- and learning-theoretic simulation approaches can lead to fruitful results.

A central topic is interactive rationality, or rational behavior that emerges from interaction. Unlike “rational interaction”—its much better known sister—it does not presuppose agents to be rational to begin with. Examples are given by evolutionary game-theory, which studies rational
(equilibrium-reaching) behavior emerging from interaction of non-reflective agents; or learning-theoretic models of inquiry showing how inquiry can solve inductive problems, while substituting truth-tracking efficiency to reflexive justification.

Subject.

We welcome submissions of either already published research, or
original material, primarily on the following topics:

  • Relations between “ecological rationality” of choice and inference heuristics, and choice-, decision- and game-theoretic axiomatic approaches to rationality;
  • Models of signaling games, evolutionary games, or games with bounded agents;
  • Learning-theoretic approaches of inquiry, knowledge acquisition and reasoning;
  • Simulation-based approaches of group learning and decision-making in networks.

Submissions on related subjects not listed above are welcome. If the number of original contributions is sufficient, we will consider the
publication of a proceedings volume.

Submissions – Abstracts.

Original submission: abstracts of 200-500 words, plus bibliography

Published research: abstract of the published version, plus bibliography.

Submissions should be sent electronically in word or pdf format to justine[dot]jacot[at]fil[dot]lu[dot]se, with ”G.I.R.L.’12@Lund_Submission” in the subject line of the mail, and whether your submission is intended for the graduate session.

Deadline for submissions: January 31, 2012.

Invited Speakers (pending confirmation).

Alexandru Baltag (ILLC, Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Nina Gierasimczuk (University of Groningen, Netherlands)

Vincent F. Hendricks (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)

Kevin Kelly (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA, US)

Paul Pedersen (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA, US)

Ruth Poproski (Carnegie Mellon University , Pittsburgh PA, US)

Patricia Rich (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA, US)

Sonja Smets (University of Groningen, Netherlands and ILLC, Amsterdam)

Calendar/Important dates.

January, 31: Abstract submission deadline

February, 29: Authors notification

April, 19-20: Conference

April, 21: Undergraduate/Graduate Session

Local organizing Committee

Emmanuel Genot (Lund, Theoretical Philosophy)

Justine Jacot (Lund, Theoretical Philosophy)

Philip Pärnamets (Lund, Cognitive Science)

Webpage of the conference:

http://www.fil.lu.se/conferences/conference.asp?id=49&lang=se

Submitted by Justine Jacot


Kitcher on Parfit

January 21, 2012

Here is Philip’s timely review in The New Republic.


Nils-Eric Sahlin: “How can we be moral when we are so irrational?”

January 20, 2012

Nils-Eric Sahlin, Professor and Chair of Medical Ethics of the Faculty of Medicine at Lund University, will deliver a Games and Decisions lecture, “How can we be moral when we are so irrational?” Renowned for his contributions to decision theory, the philosophy of risk, and the theory of evidence, recently Sahlin has been examining the interface between morality and rationality. What follows is an abstract of his lecture to be delivered Wednesday, January 25, 2012, at Carnegie Mellon University.

Normative ethics usually presupposes background accounts of human agency, and although different ethical theorists might have different pictures of human agency in mind, there is still something like a standard account that most of mainstream normative ethics can be understood to rest on. Ethical theorists tend to have Rational Man, or at least some close relative to him, in mind when constructing normative theories. It will be argued here that empirical findings raise doubts about the accuracy of this kind of account; human beings fall too far short of ideals of rationality for it to be meaningful to devise normative ideals within such a framework. Instead, it is suggested, normative ethics could be conducted more profitably if the idea of unifying all ethical concerns into one theoretical account is abandoned. This disunity of ethical theorizing would then match the disunited and heuristic-oriented nature of our agency.


Games and Decisions Discussion Group
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University

Wednesday, January 25, 2012
12:30-1:30 pm BH 150

As usual, all are invited to attend. To ensure that we can accommodate all lunchtime guests, please contact Kevin Zollman to signal your intention to attend.


Kelly and Lin at the ILLC

January 19, 2012

At the ILLC in Amsterdam, a new monthly LogiCIC seminar series has been organized within the ERC project on “The Logical Structure of Correlated Information Change”. The organizers of the first seminar, Sonja Smets and Nina Gierasimczuk, invite all to participate.

Every month, the seminar will host one or two invited speakers who present their latest research results on topics in Logic, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. For the opening of this seminar next Tuesday, two speakers will present: Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin from Carnegie Mellon University.

Time: Tuesday, January 24 2012, 16:00-18:00
Place: Amsterdam, Science Park 904, room A1.10

Programme:
16:00-16:50 Kevin T. Kelly (joint with Hanti Lin), “Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning”
16:50-17:10 Coffee Break
17:10-18:00 Hanti Lin (joint with Kevin T. Kelly), “Uncertain Acceptance and Contextual Dependence on Questions”

Abstracts:

Title: Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning
Abstract: This paper concerns the extent to which propositional reasoning can track probabilistic reasoning, which addresses kinematic problems that extend the familiar Lottery paradox. An acceptance rule (Leitgeb 2010) assigns to each Bayesian credal state p a propositional belief revision method B_p, which specifies an initial belief state B_p(\top), that is revised into the new propositional belief state B(E) upon receipt of information E. The acceptance rule *tracks* Bayesian conditioning when B_p(E) = B_p|_E(\top), for every E such that p(E) > 0; namely, when acceptance by propositional belief revision equals Bayesian conditioning followed by acceptance. Standard proposals for acceptance and belief revision do not track Bayesian conditioning. The “Lockean” rule that accepts propositions above a probability threshold is subject to the familiar lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961), and we show that it is also subject to new and more stubborn paradoxes when the tracking property is taken into account. Moreover, we show that the familiar AGM approach to belief revision (Harper 1975 and Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985) cannot be realized in a sensible way by an acceptance rule that tracks Bayesian conditioning. Finally, we present a plausible, alternative approach that tracks Bayesian conditioning and avoids all of the paradoxes. It combines an odds-based acceptance rule proposed originally by Levi (1996) with a non-AGM belief revision method proposed originally by Shoham (1987). As an application, the Lottery paradox turns out to receive a new solution motivated by dynamic concerns.

Title: Uncertain Acceptance and Contextual Dependence on Questions
Abstract: The preface paradox goes like this: an author may argue for a thesis in each chapter of her book, but in the preface she does not want to be committed to the conjunction of all theses, allowing for the possibility of error. The paradox illustrate a problem about acceptance of uncertain propositions across questions: for each chapter, there is the binary question whether its conclusion is correct; the preface asks a more complex question, namely, which theses are correct. The paradox is that asking for more can yield less. This paper addresses the extent to which acceptance of uncertain propositions depends on the question in context, by providing two impossibility results formulated in the following. Let uncertainty be modeled by subjective probability. Understand a *question* as having potential, complete answers that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive; understand *answers* as disjunctions of complete answers. Assume that accepted answers within each question are closed under entailment. Assume, further, that acceptance is *sensible* in the sense that contradiction is never accepted, that answers of certainty are always accepted, and that every answer can be accepted without certainty. Then, as our first result, it is impossible that acceptance is *independent of questions*, namely, that if a proposition is accepted as an answer to a question, then it is accepted in every question to which it is an answer.

In light of the preceding result, one might settle on a weaker sense of question-independence. Say that a question is *refined* by another question if and only if each answer to the former question continues to be an answer to the latter question. As a weakening of question-independence, *refinement-monotonicity* requires that when an answer is accepted in a question, that answer is also accepted in every refined question. But refinement-monotonicity is too strong to be plausible, because, due to our second result, it is inconsistent with two intuitive principles for reasoning within each individual question. These two principles are: *cautious monotonicity* (i.e., do not retract accepted propositions when you learn what you already accept), and *case reasoning* (i.e., accept a proposition if it would be accepted no matter whether information E or its negation is learned), where information learning is assumed to follow the Bayesian ideal of conditioning.


Second Call for Papers: Trivalent Logics and Their Applications (ESSLLI 2012)

January 17, 2012

Second Call for Papers

Trivalent Logics and Their Applications

ESSLLI 2012 – Opole, Poland – August 13-17, 2012

 Workshop description.

Trivalent logics have been an object of extensive study since at least the work of Lukasiewicz, with applications to a wide range of natural language phenomena, including presupposition, conditionals and vagueness. While many-valued logics can be studied on their own, there has been a regain of interest for three-valued logics in recent years, with the emergence of new perspectives regarding their applicability to natural language.

In the theory of presupposition projection, in particular, the question of whether the projection of presupposition can be dealt with by means of a trivalent truth-functional semantics has been the object of renewed attention, in particular because truth-functional trivalent approaches appear as a main competitor to both dynamic and pragmatic approaches (viz. Beaver and Krahmer 2001, George 2008, Fox 2008, all of them giving special attention to so-called middle-Kleene logic proposed by Peters, and the recent debates with Schlenker). In the area of vagueness, ways have been proposed to combine the canonical paracomplete and paraconsistent three-valued logics of Kleene and Priest in order to deal with the paradoxes of vagueness, and to account for phenomena such as meaning coarsening and strengthening (viz. Avron et Konikowska 2008, Cobreros et al. 2010). In the literature on conditionals, finally, the question remains largely open of the selection between a wide range of candidates for the definition of a suitable three-valued conditional (viz. Bradley 2002, Cantwell 2008, Huitink 2009, Rothschild 2009). From a more foundational point of view, finally, the meaning attached to the third truth value can vary significantly depending on the problem under consideration and the definition of logical consequence considered to be relevant.

The aim of this workshop is to solicit new contributions for the extension of two-valued logic with a third truth-value. Submissions are encouraged on logical and linguistics aspects of the use of 3-valued logics, with relevance on the following topics:

  • applications of trivalent logic to quantification in natural language
  • trivalent logics for conditionals / vagueness / presupposition
  • are vagueness and presupposition susceptible of a unified treatment in trivalent logic?
  • logical consequence and proof-theory for three-valued logic
  • unification and classification of 3-valued logics
  • connection between 3-valued logics and other non-classical logics
  • partial 2-valued logics vs. 3-valued logics
  • do we need more than three truth-values? can we dispense with a third truth value?

Invited speakers.

Arnon Avron

Janneke Huitink

Grzegorz Malinowski

Submission details.

Submission should be made via the workshop website:

http://paulegre.free.fr/TrivalentESSLLI/index.html

or directly on Easychair:

https://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=trivalent2012

Please send your submission in PDF format, at most 10 pages. The recommended submission style is LNCS style, 10 pts, bibliography included (see http://www.springer.com/computer/lncs?SGWID=0-164-6-793341-0). If needed due to space reasons, technical material such as proofs may be added in an appendix of at most 5 pages.

We are working to arrange for a special journal issue to publish revised and extended versions of the best conference papers.

All participants will have to register to ESSLLI.

Important Dates.

Deadline for Submission: March 2, 2012

Author Notification: April 15, 2012

Inclusion in ESSLLI Proceedings: June 1, 2012

Workshop in Opole: August 13, 17, 2012

Program committee.

Arnon Avron

Pablo Cobreros

Paul Egré (co-chair)

Janneke Huitink

Grzegorz Malinowski

David Ripley (co-chair)

Robert van Rooij

Sponsors.

Project ‘Borderlineness and Tolerance’ (FFI2010-16984, directed by P. Cobreros) funded by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Government of Spain

European Research Council (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Advanced Grant agreement n°229 441-CCC (CPR project, directed by F. Recanati)

EURYI project “Presupposition: A formal pragmatic approach” hosted by Institut Jean-Nicod (directed by P. Schlenker)

The workshop is organized as part of the 24th edition of the European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information

Website and Contact.

http://paulegre.free.fr/TrivalentESSLLI/index.html

Submitted by Paul Egré


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 88 other followers